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ABSTRACT
Procyon LLC had re-launched and renamed their music discovery site, Electra, to Capella, in 2008. Its core strength had
originated from Electra’s proprietary technology, which used music libraries from real people, its members, to generating
“automated word-of-mouth” recommendations, targeted advertising and editorial content. With the re-launch, Capella’s focus
changed from a business-to-consumer destination site to a demonstration site for Procyon as it pursued a new business-tobusiness strategy. What led Procyon to make this strategic change? What products and services should it market, and to
whom? This case describes the transition from music recommendation to preference mapping, and provides students with a
variety of alternative partnering options to consider as they move forward.
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1. BACKGROUND
1.1. Introduction
In this case, a small entrepreneurial firm made a move from
providing a music recommendation product, Electra, to relaunching a new product, Capella, with a new purpose.
Instead of focusing on end users in a saturated market,
Procyon used its experiences with music discovery to find
new partners and customers in the business-to-business
(B2B) marketplace that would benefit from their
personalized music recommendations, advertising and
editorial content preference mapping technology. The
business on which the case is based has been disguised to
protect the source.
The case is especially useful for graduate MBA and upper
level MIS students studying e-commerce, Internet marketing,
strategy, or entrepreneurship. In the MBA course, the case
could be used to consider the overall strategy for an
organization in a rapidly evolving e-commerce environment.
In a strategy course, the notion of core competency becomes
key as Procyon seeks to apply its technology to a different
marketplace. For entrepreneurship, the case illustrates the
need for small businesses to be nimble and adaptable. MIS
students could explore how online music sites with
recommendation features work, and which components can
be used by business partners. E-commerce students would
benefit from analyzing this type of Internet business as it
moves from a business to consumer (B2C) orientation to
B2B, and its struggle to find the right market segment and
business partners.
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Learning Objectives
As stated above, the case provides opportunities for
discussion on various topics by both undergraduate and
graduate students. The major objective is to determine the
company’s core competencies, assess the different directions
it could take with its shift in strategy, and make a case for
pursuing new B2B choices with new business partners. Other
learning objectives are:
1) To discuss how a small technology company’s mission
and strategy has evolved over time and why.
2) To explore the nature of the online music marketplace and
discuss industry directions.
3) To discuss the concept of the “long tail” (Anderson, 2008)
and the impact this has had on e-commerce.
4) To discuss the impact of Web advertising and marketing,
as well as other nontraditional method, such as the use of
social media.
5) To discuss critical success factors based on competitor
analysis, and then to decide what Procyon’s critical success
factors are.
6) To examine different types of B2B partnering
arrangements.
7) To explore the phenomena of both the “local web” and
geo-location, and the broad market opportunity associated
with targeted advertising based on taste and psychographics
as an extension of demographic targeting – first in music,
and then potentially in other categories.
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2. THE CASE
The following sections provide company background and
evolution up to the re-launch of the new recommendation
site, an analysis of music recommendation systems and the
Internet marketplace. The case then describes the options
Procyon faced in pursuing a B2B strategy. The ultimate
decision is left for students to discuss.
2.1. Company Background: Procyon LLC
Procyon LLC was founded in 2004 as Procyon Music LLC
by Laura Hewitt, Elizabeth Gray, Ray McCarthy, and Sergei
Bodrow. Ray and Elizabeth had built software that could
provide music recommendations, but lacked the business and
music industry connections to market it. Laura and Sergei
had the music industry connections as a result of work they
had done together on a music festival, and Sergei had
received ten Grammy Award nominations; in addition,
Laura’s experience at a leading computer software
organization followed by a successful entrepreneurial
venture in the mobile phone industry gave the group the
necessary know-how and impetus to move forward. The
original vision for the company focused on combining the
music recommendation software and the management team’s
connections in the music industry to provide a launch pad for
music discovery, especially for “indie” artists that needed
more exposure. In 2005 Procyon launched a desktop
application for music discovery called Electra. The original
technology
behind
Electra
generated
music
recommendations by comparing a user’s own iTunes
libraries and listening behavior with other listeners’ song
collections and listening behaviors. At the time, providing a
means for new artists to be discovered by linking them to
other artists based on users’ listening preferences was
unique.
During the first few years, Procyon received several seed
grants from the North Coast Technology Institute. These
grants were used to improve user navigation and usability
testing for the application, develop the infrastructure and
features needed to help the business generate revenue, extend
the technology to make video and movie recommendations,
and create programs to attract music industry partners. In
2008, the application, which had been cumbersome to
download and use, was completely redesigned and relaunched as Capella, a Web-based service that by this time
had accumulated a database of over ten million tracks.
2.2 Procyon’s Management Team
The CEO of Procyon, Laura Hewitt created Procyon in 2004
and provided the leadership for the organization. Her view
was that “People are the path to music and the best way to
find new music is through others who share a similar
passion.” Elizabeth Gray became the CTO of Procyon.
Elizabeth’s work in collaborative filtering was a real
breakthrough -- she deployed her work in an early venture
that was one of the first community-based automated
recommendation systems. The technology she invented
became the foundation for the music discovery algorithms
used on Electra and Capella. Chief Engineer and co-founder
Ray McCarthy’s background included software development
at large technology firms. Truong Nguyen, Creative
Director, brought to Procyon his skills as a Web and typeface

designer, exhibit curator, and musician. Sergei Botow, VP of
Music Industry Relations, pioneered the idea of using the
Electra technology to target free, promotional MP3s to the
right audience. Electra Free Music (EFM) served as both a
marketing strategy for Electra.com and as a promotional
vehicle for the labels and artists who submitted the MP3s.
Rounding out the team was Stan Norton, in charge of
networks and eventually, web hosting.
Steven Aronson became Procyon’s President and COO in
2008, assuming responsibility for developing and executing
business and technology strategies to enable Procyon to
pursue business-to-business opportunities to generate
revenue in scale, and create new exit strategies. Previously
he had been responsible for launching, growing and
managing five new businesses and executive initiatives in
emerging markets. Steve soon hired Mark Pettinger, who had
also worked on start-up market opportunities as a short-term
advisor to assist with branding and business-to-business
marketing strategies. Steve subsequently hired Sanjit Patel as
VP of Sales and Marketing to lead business-to-business sales
and marketing efforts on a full-time basis. Sanjit had spent
more than 15 years selling and marketing high-tech products
and ideas. For an organization chart, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Organization Chart
2.3 Electra
Procyon’s principal product had been a music
recommendation system called Electra. The recommendation
system was initially based on comparing, analyzing and
sharing iTunes playlists among its members (i.e., the users of
its 20 MB desktop application). In addition to the drawback
of requiring users to download a 20 MB application and an
install process that could often involve a 20 minute wait
while it scanned a hard disk looking for music, the software
suffered from a cumbersome look and feel. In contrast,
established competitors Pandora and Last.fm only required
users to go to their site and register, and then they could
simply type in an artist and press play. Electra was harder to
figure out because of the decisions that needed to be made
regarding a number of features. In addition, Electra content
was limited to EFM full length MP3s and 30 second samples
of all other recommended music since the company elected
not to incur the significant expense of licensing music, or
play full tracks without a license and deal with the legal
consequences later.
In order to grow its user base for Electra, Procyon
implemented in the spring of 2008 a partnership with a Webbased company called Spica. Spica offered music services to
over a million college students via subscription. Procyon’s

298

Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 22(4)

patent-pending technology enabled Spica to use their users’
individual music profiles to provide personalized music
discovery opportunities and specific song recommendations,
editorial and promotional content, and connections to users
with similar musical taste to each Spica user. In return, Spica
promoted the Electra brand on their music player, and
provided direct links to the Electra website from the “My
Spica” section of its website.
3. MUSIC DISCOVERY SYSTEMS
3.1 Characteristics of the Marketplace
Music recommendation and discovery systems had been
noted as one of the top ten Internet trends of the first decade
of the 21st century (McManus, 2009). Music, as with other
forms of media, such as movies and books, had become a
commodity that required little storage space in digital form.
As user tastes had become increasingly fragmented and
specialized, marketers recognized the potential of the “long
tail” (Anderson, 2008). Blockbuster titles might have many
sales at the head of the tail, but there were also many more
titles in a huge inventory of products that sold in very small
amounts, but that, in the aggregate, could be just as
profitable. According to Tim Westergren, Pandora Radio’s
founder, 70% of music is “obscure,” and people had a hard
time both finding it in the first place and then buying it
(Starr, 2006). Recommendation systems could bring that
music to potential consumers’ attention.
Combined with music volume in the long tail was the
increased delivery of purchased music as individual songs in
digital format instead of CDs. Forrester research predicted
that by 2012 music downloads would outpace CD sales, and
forecasted an average growth rate of 23 percent in digital
sales, generating $4.8 billion in revenue (Harris, 2008). In
November 2008, Atlantic Records posted more sales of MP3
files than CDs for the first time (England, 2008). The
category killer was iTunes, Apple’s popular digital music
store. Although profit margins were slimmer for individual
tracks than for CDs, increasing sales, as well as Apple’s own
payment methods to reduce transaction fees, had started to
disprove the contention that iTunes only “broke even”
(Marsal, 2007). In addition, the characteristics of modern
technology had made Internet radio services such as Pandora
popular, as more users upgraded to personal computers with
pre-installed, media-ready hardware, software and broadband
Internet access.
A variety of distribution models for music had been
launched, ranging from e-commerce downloads to mobile
computing. E-commerce download sites, as exemplified by
iTunes, offered song downloads with various pricing
strategies. Music streaming on demand was another
distribution model, usually involving a subscription fee.
Some of the free sites offered restricted downloads supported
by ads. Other distribution models included search engine
approaches, where users could search the Internet for sites
streaming particular songs; social networking sites, offering
streaming and free downloads (e.g., MySpace Music);
mobile bundling, offering music over handheld devices;
video games offering music downloads; and artist direct
distribution, where artists could stream and sell music
directly to fans (Redwood Capital, 2010). Over time,
distinctions among many of these models had begun to blur,
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typical of any industry trend where rapid technological
breakthroughs result in multiple products and services until a
shakeout occurs (e.g., the “dot-com” boom), and consumer
preferences solidify.
Most music recommendation and discovery systems had
similar features in common. These included using an
analyzer to scan existing playlists, providing users with
controls to accept or reject recommendations, and creating
online playlists that could be shared. Some of these systems
supplied widgets or other mini-applications that could be
integrated easily with social networking sites or deployed on
a mobile device. Additional services included promotions for
related concerts, new releases, blogs or discussion forums,
access to other members’ playlists, and tools for emerging
artists to submit music. Finally, listeners were often directed
to a commercial site such as iTunes or Amazon to buy songs
they liked.
3.2 Industry Directions
The music discovery and recommendation industry seemed
to be combining various business models with others
(notably music streaming), and the industry was far from
stable, but overall the direction in 2008-2009 appeared to be
three-fold. First, there was already movement in the area of
mobile applications. Pandora, for example, became available
as an application on the iPhone in 2008. The application
allowed the user to listen to 100 stations, rate songs, and
make purchases through iTunes. Researchers were also
studying mobile devices as vehicles for viral and word of
mouth marketing. A challenge with mobile applications was
making them run on any type of handset and operating
system (Conrad, 2008). This challenge led to the second
issue, the establishment of cross-platform communities for
video, music, movies, games, and other media, so that there
was a common interface and a consistent set of services.
Pandora, Last.fm, and others were working on making music
streaming applications work in this consistent way (Sandin,
2009). The third notable direction was international
expansion. In 2006, Pandora, for example, was developing a
world “music genome” and was actively partnering with
more international labels; however, licensing issues and
subsequent litigation had stymied these initiatives, and, in
the case of Pandora, had limited membership to U.S.
residents only.
3.3 How They Work
Recommendation systems were first introduced in the mid1990s and gained traction with the success of e-commerce,
which had provided access to a vast quantity of available
goods and services, as well as a large set of consumers who
left evidence of their online behavior (e.g., cookies,
clickstream metrics, actual sales conversions, etc.). These
systems had their roots in both information retrieval and
artificial intelligence. Several approaches to providing
recommendations and aiding discovery had been used. Some
systems were completely algorithm-based and employed
some variant of k-nearest neighbor, while others worked on
the concept of collaborative filtering, based on users’
behaviors and profiles. Some systems were completely
machine-based, while others relied on human experts. In
addition, some degree of data mining software was required
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to sift through the data, looking for new, unexpected
connections.
Some of the algorithms used in recommendation systems
were reminiscent of work in case-based reasoning. One of
the best known set of methods and the simplest form of
machine learning was called k-nearest neighbor, which
looked for a certain number (k) of listeners who liked the
same songs, and then used other songs that each person in
the network had listened to as the basis for providing new
recommendations. Latent factor algorithms, though less
efficient than k-nearest neighbor, looked at patterns of
consumer preferences. Both of these methods could be
applied to domains other than music, because they could
examine consumer preferences independent of the subject
domain (e.g., music, movies, books, etc.). These methods
tended to fall short if there was limited data (e.g., a
completely new music genre) or tastes changed frequently.
Mufin was an example of an Internet music site using
algorithms to provide correlations based on song similarity
and music attributes; listeners searched for music based on
musical attributes such as tempo and mood (Lardinois,
2009). Mufin Player Pro also provided a visual k-nearest
neighbor map of user playlists based on sound attributes.
Collaborative filtering was a very widely used mechanism
for music recommendations, and often but not always
employed k-nearest neighbor algorithms. This method was
based on the concept of “the wisdom of crowds”
(Surowiecki, 2004), which posited that a large number of
independently-minded people in a community were more
accurate in their decision making or problem solving than a
group of experts. In the case of music, sites monitored
listening behavior from their user communities. What
strengthened the recommendations in addition to the
community’s consensus was the additional use of user
profiling. The profiling came from user likes and dislikes,
voting, and other comments. Last.fm was a well-known
example of a music site using collaborative filtering. It used
a technique called “audioscrobbling” to add information
about songs from a user’s computer or MP3 player to the
user’s profile on its site. Last.fm reported over 30 million
active users; the site was bought by CBS in 2008. Along
with Pandora, it was consistently listed among top music
discovery sites (“What It’s Really Like Inside Last.fm,”
2009).
Classification systems, the most notable being the Music
Genome Project powering Pandora, used expert analysis of
music attributes. The Music Genome project started in 2000
with 30 experts in music theory analyzing music from over
10,000 artists over a five-year period. The analysis was
based on attributes such as tone, rhythm, beat, or vocals.
When listening to a recommended song, users could ask why
a song was selected and the music analysis was displayed.
Users could then vote to play more songs like the one in
question, or request never to hear it again. According to Tim
Westergren, Pandora’s founder, collaborative filtering could
never be as successful for music discovery because filtering
was based on popularity, and popular listening focused on
major hits; therefore the user was not introduced to new
music as much (Starr, 2006).
In addition to algorithmic methods, collaborative filtering,
or human-based classification systems, music sites employed
different hybrid methods based on combinations of

recommendation strategies. Last.fm, for example, allowed
listeners to recommend music to each other directly in
addition to collaborative filtering; MOG allowed artists to
share their digital music libraries with fans (Bruno, 2006);
iLike, a site using a social networking approach, allowed
users to share and recommend songs, although it too scanned
music libraries on the users’ computers to make additional
recommendations. Two/thirds of iLike users accessed the
service directly from Facebook (Mortimer, 2008).
4. INTERNET MARKETING STRATEGIES
4.1 Personalization and other Forms of Revenue
Generation
In general, music discovery sites generated revenue through
targeted advertising. Banner ads or in-stream ads were often
used. The user was forced to view the ad if it was positioned
in-stream or, in the case of Pandora, the ad was shown in
order for the user to continue to listening. Rather than
showing generic advertising, however, more companies
began to consider using cookies and clickstream metrics to
track user behavior and preferences to deliver personalized
advertising via dynamic Web pages. Clickstream data was
particularly valuable, because it could reveal information
such as what items customers might have looked at but did
not purchase, what items were purchased with other items,
which advertisements generated a lot of hits but few sales, as
well as the order in which pages on the site were viewed and
other browsing behavior.
Web personalization was seen as much more important on
music sites compared to regular e-commerce sites because
users tended to spend a lot of time on a few pages and thus
had a higher engagement level, an effect often referred to as
“stickiness.” Traditional metrics such as cost per impression,
therefore, did not capture this deeper relationship. Targeted
advertising that offered the listener something of value (e.g.,
a screen skin) was seen as essential to building and nurturing
that relationship (Morrissey, Harding, and Bruno, 2009).
Web personalization helped to reduce the feeling of
information overload and also provided access to the long
tail. Beginning in 2004, ChoiceStream, a recommendation
service provider, had conducted an annual survey on
personalization to U.S. adult Internet users. Several of the
key findings from the 2008 survey covered personalized
Web advertising. Frequent shoppers (58%), as well as 50%
of the biggest spenders, were more likely to click on
personalized ads. Most respondents (79%) also
acknowledged the impact of advertising’s influence and
brand advertising on their consumption habits; they also
understood that Web purchase behavior was collected to
determine how to target ads. Seventy-eight percent of
consumers were interested in receiving personalized content,
particularly for “cultural goods” (e.g., music (40%), books
(32%), and DVDs (29%)). They also saw the value of
personalization in improving their experiences on social
networking sites. However, poor quality recommendations
were noted, such as inappropriate recommendations or
recommendations unrelated to their online shopping
(ChoiceStream, Inc., 2008).
Affiliate sales were also used to generate revenue. For
example, an iTunes affiliate would be allowed to use Apple’s
marketing material in emails, web sites, and Internet
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promotions. The affiliate could also link to the iTunes store,
as well as to content and applications for an Apple device,
such as the iPod. Commissions were earned from links to
iTunes from the affiliate’s site (iTunes, 2011). If a user
bought a song through an affiliate’s link to iTunes, the site
would receive part of the royalty.
Music sites often also featured subscription services to
provide the user with additional benefits including a lack of
advertising, unlimited listening, and preference on the server
(Pack, 2008). The real challenge, according to Felix Miller,
founder of Last.fm, was getting the customer to the site.
After that, he said, “we invariably have a user for life”
(“What It’s Really Like Inside Last.fm,” 2009, p. 55). For
traditional marketers, social network sites offered more
opportunities to offer promotions, such as coupons or free
music downloads. In addition to tracking more traditional
Web metrics, marketers could use search capabilities, found
on sites like Twitter, to find keywords of interest and could
even trace that down to who initiated, participated, or
followed the tweets.
4.2 Viral Marketing, Word of Mouth, and Web 2.0
Viral marketing, also known as network, buzz marketing, or
word of mouth (WOM) referred to any strategy that used
individuals to pass on a marketing message, thereby
increasing its reach. Principles in a successful viral
marketing strategy included giving away valuable free goods
and services, making the transfer of them easy between
individuals, using motivation (e.g., getting something now),
planning for scalability if the promotion took off, leveraging
existing networked communities, and using others’
resources, such as affiliate programs (Wilson, 2005).
Although the marketing message originated with the
company, its effect could be exponential since individuals
that were excited about the product or service increased the
buzz by promoting it on their own without compensation.
For cultural goods such as books, movies, and music,
WOM was a powerful promotional vehicle. It could be
especially effective for media items that received limited
promotion, as opposed to blockbusters which were
extensively advertised prior to their release. WOM had been
shown to be very effective in extending the lifetime value of
the customer. For niche items in particular, interest tended to
spread more slowly due to limited access or exposure;
interest also was more likely to spread by word of mouth
(Higham, 2005). WOM thus became a customer-driven way
of mining the long tail. The Internet served as an efficient,
low-cost delivery vehicle for WOM “seeded” campaigns.
WOM delivered a way to circumvent the continual erosion
of positive consumer attitudes toward traditional marketing
communication strategies. Finally, customers could generate
excitement through positive WOM, which would increase
the likelihood that they would return to a site. WOM was
particularly well suited for social networking sites. In social
networks, WOM was generated through invitations to join,
requests to follow others, becoming fans of members or
businesses, as well as specific recommendations. Consumers
would be more likely to modify their purchasing behavior,
based upon the effect of this “third party” relationship. It
could be especially critical if a consumer had no previous
experience with the product or service and used WOM to
make decisions.
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Music discovery sites had been promoted on social
networking sites. Twitter, which had a music player, was
also being used for music streaming. Applications like
TwistenFM, a mashup of a music service Grooveshark and
Twitter (Fitzpatrick, 2009), scanned tweets for mentions of
songs, and added links to them to play through Twitter’s
music player. Twitter’s open development platform made it
easy to build applications using this service’s capabilities.
Twitter had also been studied for its use as a WOM vehicle.
Research found that 19% of tweets mentioned a brand; of
those tweets, 20% contained opinions or emotions about
brands (Bruno, 2009).
5. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PROCYON
5.1 Music Discovery Re-launch
Procyon’s B2C site was overhauled extensively, and was relaunched and re-branded as Capella in November 2008. In
addition to the new and improved features (see below),
Capella’s purpose was redefined. Its primary focus was no
longer a B2C destination site in what had become a more
established market with big players with expensive music
licensing agreements such as Last.fm and Pandora. Instead, it
would primarily be used as a demonstration site and test bed
for its recommendation and editorial and advertising
preference mapping technology and new company initiatives
using free music and video content from YouTube and
Capella Free Music (CFM) – a free music catalog based on
the free music supplied by Procyon partners (e.g., labels,
digital marketers, associations, individual artists, etc.).
Capella was launched as a server-based recommendation
and advertising and editorial content preference mapping
service that included an optional iTunes “Helper” for users
interested in a richer music discovery and recommendation
experience based on their favorite music in their iTunes
library. It also featured a more user-friendly interface with
greatly improved content. Although the details of its
technology were proprietary, in general the recommendation
and preference mapping solution demonstrated on Capella
was a collaborative filtering solution that used statistical
techniques and data-mining methodologies to compare a
user’s taste in music to other users across the community to
make automated “word-of-mouth” recommendations from
the community to each user (or from users to each other).
The solution’s tiered approach enabled recommendations to
be provided even if only one artist was provided to start the
recommendations process – actively (e.g., typing an artist’s
name into a search box) or passively (e.g., by browsing an
artist’s page). More precise recommendations could be
provided initially if the user chose to download the optional
iTunes Helper. In either case, the solution was focused on
providing
efficient,
precise
and
broad-based
recommendations that included “long-tail” discovery (i.e.,
discovering new music that includes less well-known artists
that cater to specialized niches). The result of these
advancements enabled the recommendations and targeting of
advertising and editorial content to be more flexible,
scalable, and easy to integrate with partners and customers
via a web service operating through a standard API
(application programming interface) Procyon created. In
addition, the same technology could be applied to categories
beyond music (e.g., books, music, video, travel, financial
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services, healthcare, etc.) with the right additional data
sources.

Figure 2: Pandora Web Site Showing a Smart Playlist
(Source: Pandora.com)
The user experience centered on making a “smart” playlist
built around a taste profile (see Figure 2 for an example
similar to Capella’s player). The profile was generated from
voting on songs (liked/disliked), searches the user performed
looking for particular artists or songs. Smart playlists could
be enhanced by adding selected YouTube videos. Users
could access their smart playlists from any computer, and
non-registered users could easily find saved smart playlists
(available from cookie information on the computer that they
had used to create them). Smart playlists could be renamed
and shared with others. It was also possible to copy other
users’ smart playlists. Procyon also built a catalog of over
10,000 songs from over 1,000 labels, digital marketers,
associations, independent artists, etc., and allowed the user to
listen to and download full-length tracks. Tracks could easily
be added to or deleted from smart playlists, andvoting on
tracks could enhance the recommendations. Tracks that were
not free for download were identified and linked to YouTube
videos; the user could link from Capella to purchase these
songs from online music stores.
Once the site was tested and fine-tuned, Procyon promoted
it to determine how to best sell their recommendation and
taste-targeted advertising and editorial content capabilities to
prospective partners and customers, and drive their business
goals as well. Procyon established presences on Facebook,
MySpace, and Twitter, which strengthened existing
relationships with their listeners as well as attracting new
listeners from current users’ social networks. Procyon also
developed a widget (see Figure 3 for an example similar to
Proycon’s widget). Using a widget was seen as a way to
extend the promotional reach of business partners and
customers using Procyon’s recommendation and advertising
and editorial content preference mapping technology, as well
as creating a data asset for other sites, such as social network
sites, music blogs, and content partner sites.
Procyon recognized that Capella could be most valuable in
the near-term as a demonstration site to test new services
after time and money spent on technology and marketing the

site resulted in only small increases in user acquisition.
Music sites needed “deep pockets” to pay the licensing fees
to record labels. Procyon needed to redefine itself as a
company, in terms of its core competencies, and then find
the products and services it could offer to a new market. The
B2C market was already dominated by key players such as
Pandora and Last.fm. The combination of licensing fees plus
the effects of the recession led the management at Procyon to
explore the B2B market in order to leverage Procyon’s core
competencies and to optimize its revenue potential by
entering partnerships with companies interested in
recommendation systems and preference mapping.
During this period, Procyon had implemented a successful
partnership with Spica, a college music Web site. Procyon
had provided an API, which allowed business partners to
integrate the technology into their websites without coding.
This was a tremendous advantage because other software
systems required adopters to write extensive program code to
link their applications. Second, Procyon proved that they
were able to scale efficiently – they were able to
accommodate growth as the number of subscribers grew
without a decrease in performance. Third, Proycon

Figure 3: Pandora Sample Widget (Source:
bgreco.net/gadgets/Pandora)
was able to improve the user experience and correspondingly
the site metrics (frequency, length of stay, page views,
impressions) to improve the economics of the site (e.g.,
reducing churn of existing subscribers and making the site
more engaging for attracting new subscribers). Although
Spica became a victim of the recession, the partnership had
served as proof of Procyon’s technology and business
acumen.
5.3 Identifying the B2B opportunities
Based on their success with Spica, Procyon conducted an
analysis to determine the key competitors in B2B preference
mapping. Most of Procyon’s key competitors were privately
held firms who did not publish marketing or financial
information; they spanned different business categories such
as consumer electronics, content management, software
development, mobile applications, online media sales, and
retail media sales. Procyon was not only interested in
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identifying the competitors, but in looking at various critical
success factors such as:
1. Type of recommendation/discovery technology.
For example, what degree of personalization
was offered? Were there interfaces to social
networks, or extensions such as widgets? Was
content management part of the package? Did
the technology work across multiple platforms
and devices? How scalable was the software?
2. Pricing model used. For example, were there
initial fees for software installation or setup?
Were there ongoing licensing, service, or
maintenance fees? Were there additional fees
for customization? What revenue share would
be received for transactions or ads?
3. Company stability and maturity. How long had
they been in business? What was the size and
type of customer relationships? What types of
website content, programs, or tools were
available for their partners? Were they
financially stable and positioned for growth?
In all, nine competitors were identified based on a
weighted set of critical success factors. The top three
standouts were Gracenote, Media Unbound, and Strands.
Gracenote, a subsidiary of Sony, offered products and
services including music recommendation, playlist
generation, content management, and a technology for
finding music through voice commands. Gracenote’s clients
were primarily in the fields of software development
(notably iTunes), portable and mobile applications,
automotive
systems,
and
home
entertainment
(http://www.gracenote.com/). Media Unbound’s offerings
included customizable playlists, including video playlists,
recommendations tailored to specific regions, and a tool that
could match users’ playlists based on how much a user could
“gain” from a match with another user. Media Unbounds’
clients included eMusic (similar to iTunes), Viacom, and
Napster (http://www.mediaunbound.com/). Strands offered
recommendation tools aimed at businesses to track customer
tastes over time, and services to deliver related content based
on customers’ (and their friends’) views, page clicks, and
ratings. Configurable widgets were available for site, email
and mobile applications. Strands also provided an ecommerce merchandising interface to control when
recommendations were shown, content filtering tools, and
reporting and testing for social media creators. Their clients
included General Mills, SkyMall, and BodyGlove
(http://recommender.strands.com/home.php).
Next, Procyon identified potential business partners and
customers: retail enterprises, widget creators, marketing
services, music-focused sellers, and artists’ services. Retail
enterprises, whether strictly web-based or bricks and clicks
(e.g., CD Universe) were attractive markets for Procyon.
These enterprises were interested in driving demand across a
wide variety of shopping categories. Many retail web sites
could benefit from improved recommendation technologies,
owned large music catalogs, and drew lots of web traffic.
There were additional opportunities to move into
recommendations for other types of products. The large sizes
of many retailers, however, could make them a “tough sell”
to partner with a small company. They might have been
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developing their own in-house solutions, and they tended to
rely less on third-party targeted ads.
Widget providers (e.g., Widgetbox) allowed users to
create content, put it into a widget format, and then embed it
on a website, blog or social media page. They provided a
means for quick, viral, and highly scalable distribution.
These companies offered an established distribution network,
relationships with social media outlets, and a solutions track
record, but many of them were in the early stages of
development and could require different (individually
tailored) partnership agreements. Many of these providers
lacked music widgets, and could benefit from preference
mapping technology as an enhancement.
Marketing services providers (e.g., 9seconds) as well as
advertising networks (e.g., Google’s AdSense) offered
potential partnership opportunities. Marketing services
included search engine marketing and search optimization,
pay-per-click management, affiliate marketing, email and
direct marketing, as well as consulting services. This type of
organization could be interested in taste-targeted advertising
or interactive taste-oriented services. Advertising networks
such as Google’s AdSense provided sponsored ads on client
Web sites, and featured the ability to customize those ads.
Ad network services would be looking for assistance in
executing various functions such as recruiting advertisers,
providing the technological infrastructure, serving the ads,
and handling the collection of advertiser payments.
Music-focused sellers and artists’ services were also
highlighted as potential partners, especially middle-tier
enterprises, whose focus was driving ad revenue and/or
transactions. Music focused sellers such as ArtistDirect
offered multimedia content, music news, and music
discussion forums. These sites tended to lack
recommendation engines or even music catalogs, but would
be more willing to partner with a smaller company than
would big retail sites. They could benefit from a more
refined, targeted approach instead of relying on third party
ads. As with widget creators, many of these enterprises were
not mature and had many different business models, so
adopting a strategy would have to be custom designed for
each prospect. Artists’ services (e.g., Nimbit.com) offered a
variety of integrated tools to create, upload, share, distribute,
and promote music, concert tickets and other promotional
items. These services met the needs of growing numbers of
“working class” artists – artists with day jobs and local
followings trying to expand into larger markets and get
national attention through relationships with iTunes, Amazon
and other distributors. Was there an opportunity to target
their output more precisely?
5.4 Finding the Right Partners with the Right Services:
Decision Time
As Procyon evolved its recommendation and advertising and
editorial content preference mapping technology, it was
asked by prospective partners and customers to develop
contest technology as a natural extension of their
recommendation technology. They developed a turnkey
solution for companies to develop their own playlists on
which users could vote. The playlists were not limited to
music, but could include album art, YouTube videos, or
similar content. Companies needed to establish a broadcaster
account with Procyon, which would enable them to create
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multiple contest categories and items, as well as creating
their own voting player with custom colors, logo, and
dimensions. The player could then be easily posted to a Web
site or blog (see Figure 4 for an example of a music contest).
In addition to seeking out big partners with a national
footprint, Procyon realized that preference mapping efforts

Figure 4: Music Contest Example (Source: eurovision.tv)
could be deployed over the “local web” (Turoczy, 2009).
The local web represented a convergence of social networks,
locally focused offerings from sites such as Craigslist, the
proliferation of customer reviews for local music, local
Facebook and MySpace pages, and online local directories
that were replacing traditional telephone yellow pages.
Access to local content was being strengthened by increased
use of mobile technologies, especially smart phones. In
addition, geo-location, whereby advertising content could be
served to consumers based on their location, was starting to
be deployed using Twitter and mobile phone apps. If the
content could be based on individual preferences plus
location, this model could be a potential application for
preference mapping.
Enormous potential was emerging for revenue generation
in marketing new releases through brand and music
alignment. The Music Marketing Forum of 2009 highlighted
the beneficial relationships to be gained from brand-music
associations, and presented five key objectives in these
partnerships: exposure, markets, imaging, distribution, and
revenue (MIDEM, 2009). Exposure had traditionally been
the main objective, but as both artists and brands sought new
markets, image or brand perception became more important.
Therefore it was even more important to target brand
promotions
to
users
carefully.
For
example,
recommendations in music to heavy metal enthusiasts could
lead to product recommendations, but who were these
listeners? Would the brand’s image appeal to this market
segment?
Targeted recommendations could leverage the relationship
between branding and music sponsorships. Sponsorship
spending had increased 3.8 percent in 2009, up from $1.04
billion in 2008, and corporations were increasingly focused
on associating brands with individual artists in addition to
music festivals (Waddell, 2009). For example, Jessica
Simpson’s and Avril Lavigne’s relationship with the

Proactive skin care product line created an opportunity to
link those promotions on music sites for persons who like
those artists. In addition, artists increasingly sought nontraditional distribution channels for new releases. Releasing
new music on a company’s Web site or retail establishment
could strengthen the relationship with the brand, as well as
providing additional metrics to fine-tune preference mapping
initiatives.
Procyon needed to focus on identifying the products and
services they could offer to the potential partners. The
question was, what and to whom? There seemed to be many
directions to pursue. What they brought to the table was a
proprietary technology, along with taste-based content and
connections to users. How should this filtering technology be
deployed? One solution would be embedding it in widgets,
which had already been successfully tested for the B2C user.
What about emerging artists and labels? How could
Procyon’s technology allow them to find supportive and
profitable business relationships? Was the content
management
functionality worthwhile?
Were the
promotional tools that were developed, such as contests,
something that could be of value to partners? How could
preference mapping- be deployed both at the national and
local levels?
Procyon also saw that their focus would have to shift from
development to sales in order to land lucrative deals with
business partners. The plan for using Capella as a
demonstration site only diminished the need for a company
with limited resources to maintain content on the site or
develop new features. What would the implications be for
the staff, including some of the creative team who had
founded the company? Which partners were most likely to
be receptive to a young, energetic enterprise? Would that be
limited to the small to mid-size market, or a larger one?
Should Procyon focus on cultural goods, or look to deploy its
technologies in related areas? What could it offer to social
media sites, or the local community? There seemed to be a
lot of opportunities for evaluating and promoting content,
and making it accessible to the right people. Procyon’s
challenge was to make the most sustainable and profitable
choices.
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